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A PRETTY SMART ANSWER: JUSTIFYING THE 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR’S “SEMINOLE FIX” FOR 
THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT 
Austin R. Vance* 
 
[W]ith great reluctance . . . I am supporting [the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act]. 
— John McCain, United States Senator1 
[W]hen we get North America back I'll be satisfied. 
— Kevin Washburn, Former Assistant 
Secretary of Indian Affairs2 
I. Introduction 
When Senator John McCain questioned Kevin Washburn about a 
casino’s proposed location, the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs 
responded, “Senator, it was your bill. You wrote the language. We’re just 
applying it.”3 Senator McCain, in turn, retorted, “You know something, Mr. 
Washburn, that is a pretty smart ass answer.”4 While the opposing 
ideologies of Washburn and McCain alone could spur hostile conversation, 
this contentious questioning was the result of the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act (IGRA), a law that has caused numerous political and legal 
controversies since its conception.5 The dispute surrounding IGRA has 
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Thanks are owed to 
Paula Hart and Maria Wiseman of the Department of the Interior—Office of Indian Gaming 
and Dr. Neil Metz of the University of Central Oklahoma for their contributions to this 
comment. 
 1. S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 33 (1988). 
 2. Indian Gaming 2015: Keynote Address by Kevin Washburn, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING 
ASS’N (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.indiangaming.org/media-releases/2015/4/2/indian-gaming-
2016-keynote-address-by-kevin-washburn. 
 3. Keep the Promise Act of 2014, Hearing on S. 2670 Before the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 7 (2014) (statement of Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary 
of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Interior). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 WYO. L. REV. 427, 
436 (2001). 
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been unaided by the fact that Indian gaming has exploded from a centuries 
old cultural practice into an industry that generates nearly 30 billion dollars 
a year.6 Nonetheless, Mr. Washburn’s “smart ass answer” had merit, as the 
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs—acting on behalf of the Secretary of 
the Interior (Secretary) and the President of the United States—executes 
IGRA despite its various ambiguities,7 and recent court decisions have been 
far from helpful.8 
More specifically, the political dispute about IGRA often revolves 
around the authorization of tribes to conduct class III gaming, which is 
composed of high-revenue casino-style gaming, such as blackjack and slot 
machines.9 This authorization was restricted, however, as class III gaming 
must be “conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered 
into by the Indian tribe and the State.”10 These compacts are merely 
agreements that clarify the legal jurisdiction between a tribe and a state over 
a casino to prevent confusion.11 
Unfortunately, Congress was unaware that it could not force states to 
compact with tribes as that was “beyond its authority.”12 In Seminole Tribe 
of Florida v. Florida (Seminole), the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that IGRA could not abrogate a state’s right to sovereign immunity, 
meaning that tribes could not sue states unwilling to negotiate class III 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See id.; 2014 Tribal Gaming Revenue by Gaming Operation Revenue Range, NAT’L 
INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, http://www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/reports/2014GGRbyGaming 
OperationRevenueRange.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2015); Brian P. McClatchey, A Whole 
New Game: Recognizing the Changing Complexion of Indian Gaming by Removing the 
"Governor's Veto" for Gaming on "After-Acquired Lands", 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1227, 
1239 (2004). 
 7. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996); see also Carcieri 
v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009).548.(2009). Rev. 527, 548 (2009).The case ion Acting 
and tent of IGRA to provide for economic sustainability and tribal self-dete 
 9. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
39, 46 (2007) (noting the transition to “lucrative casino-style gaming”); Alan E. Brown, Ace 
in the Hole: Land's Key Role in Indian Gaming, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 159, 164 (2005) 
(“Class III gaming has historically produced the largest revenues for Indian tribes.”); 
Stephanie A. Levin, Betting on the Land: Indian Gambling and Sovereignty, 8 STAN. L. & 
POL'Y REV. 125, 127 (1997).  
 10. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2012). 
 11. JEFF CORNTASSEL & RICHARD WITMER, FORCED FEDERALISM: CONTEMPORARY 
CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD 16-17 (2008) (Defining the tribal-state compact 
as “agreements that ‘provide for the application of civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of 
either entity over Indians and non-Indians as the parties may see fit to agree.’”). 
 12. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 76. 
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aming compacts.13 Consequently, IGRA’s original purpose of tribal 
economic sustainability and self-determination was in jeopardy, as 
numerous states refused to negotiate with tribes unless the tribes made 
massive economic and legal concessions.14 
In response to that decision, the Department of the Interior (Department) 
propagated the “Class III Gaming Procedures.”15 These new regulations 
provide a mechanism to circumvent a state’s refusal to negotiate compacts 
with tribes.16 Specifically, the Class III Gaming Procedures provide that 
180 days after a tribe and state fail to negotiate a compact, and a state 
invoked sovereign immunity to avoid suit in federal court, then the tribe 
may invoke the Class III Gaming Procedures to allow class III gaming.17 
Absent these regulations, IGRA reaches an impasse,18 as the Secretary 
can only take action if a federal court determined a state negotiated a 
compact in bad faith, 19 but the Class III Gaming Regulations must omit that 
requirement to circumvent state sovereign immunity.20 A paradox arose as 
federal courts can no longer make a bad faith determination because 
Seminole held that states are immune to suits under IGRA.21  
As a result, class III gaming cannot occur without the Class III Gaming 
Procedures, which demonstrates their necessity.22 Some believe, however, 
that the Department of the Interior acted outside of the scope of IGRA 
when it published the Class III Gaming Procedures, because IGRA itself 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. at 75.548.(2009). Rev. 527, 548 (2009).he case ion Acting adn tent of IGRA to 
provide for economic sustainability and tribal self-dete 
 14. See S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 1-2 (1988); Sean Cunniff, Texas v. United States: Mind 
the Gap, 39 N.M. L. REV. 527, 531 (2009) (“Congress's findings upon enacting the 
legislation reflected the spirit of the self-determination era and the promise of gaming for 
tribal economic development.”); see also Fletcher, supra note 9, at 42 (discussing how 
bargaining power heavily favored the states over tribes).  
 15. 25 C.F.R. § 291.1-15 (2016); Cunniff, supra note 14, at 527; New Mexico v. Dep’t 
of the Interior, 1:14-CV-00695-JAP, 2014 WL 10298036, at *1 (D.N.M. Oct. 17, 2014) 
(also referred to as “Secretarial Procedures” or “Part 291 Regulations”). 
 16. 25 C.F.R. § 291.1-15. 
 17. 25 C.F.R. § 291.1-15; New York v. Jewell, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185653 
(N.D.N.Y Sept. 11, 2013). 
 18. Cunniff, supra note 14, at 548. 
 19. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2012); Gregory R. Mulkey, Texas v. United States: The 
Legality of the Secretarial Procedures Following Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 33 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 525, 528 (2008-2009). 
 20. See generally 25 C.F.R. § 291.1-15. 
 21. Cunniff, supra note 14, at 548; see also Mulkey, supra note 19, at 547. 
 22. Cunniff, supra note 14, at 548; see also Mulkey, supra note 19, at 547. 
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does not authorize the regulations.23 Given that class III gaming is already 
under tremendous political pressure,24 federal courts remain split on the 
legitimacy of the Class III Gaming Procedures, which only adds to the 
confusion of IGRA.25 
 Thus, this comment seeks to justify the Secretary of the Interior’s 
authority to circumvent the requirement that a federal court must determine 
that a state negotiated in bad faith before authorizing class III gaming 
without a tribal-state compact under IGRA.26 There are four sections to this 
analysis: The Legal History of IGRA, The De Facto Federal Court Split, 
The Policy Arguments Concerning the Class III Gaming Procedures, and 
The Conclusion. The crux of this analysis will focus on how the Class III 
Gaming Procedures fulfill the original intent of IGRA to provide for 
economic sustainability and tribal self-determination. Before that discussion 
one must understand how IGRA came to its current political state. 
II. The Legal History of IGRA 
A. American Indian Legal History Prior to IGRA 
Usually, analysis of Indian gaming begins around 1987, when the 
Supreme Court decided Cabazon v. California.27 The major fault of that 
approach is that it overlooks the structural reasons for which Indian gaming 
exists in the first place, as self-determination and economic sustainability 
would have completely different meanings if Indian tribes were sovereign 
nations.28 Moreover, ignoring pre-Cabazon history does not allow for a 
complete contextual understanding of the combative state versus tribe 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 511 (5th Cir. 2007); Rebecca S. Lindner-
Cornelius, The Secretary of the Interior As Referee: The States, the Indian Nations, and How 
Gambling Lead to the Illegality of the Secretary of the Interior's Regulations in 25 C.F.R. § 
291, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 685, 686 (2001) (“This Comment argues that these regulations are 
unconstitutional because the Secretary has exceeded the authority of its office.”). 
 24. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 39-40. 
 25. Compare Texas, 497 F.3d at 511 with the Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 
1016, 1029 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 26. 25 C.F.R. § 291.1-15. 
 27. E.g., Alan E. Brown, Ace in the Hole: Land's Key Role in Indian Gaming, 39 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 159, 161 (2005). 
 28. William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 52, 89-90 (2005). 
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relationship that is at the heart of the Seminole problem within IGRA.29 
Certainly, encompassing all of federal Indian legal history is too broad of a 
task for any comment; however, this comment’s genesislike “[s]tudents of 
American Indian law cannot--and should not--escape from . . . the opinions 
we now refer to as the ‘Marshall Trilogy.’”30 
1. The Marshall Trilogy, or Forgive Marshall for He Knows Not What 
He Did 
The Marshall Trilogy probably represents John Marshall’s greatest 
blunder, evidenced by the fact that it only took three cases for the Supreme 
Court to create and then attempt to undermine the Discovery Doctrine.31 
The Trilogy begins with Johnson v. M’Intosh, where the Supreme Court 
had to decide whether title to land vested to individuals from tribes, before 
the formation of the United States, held legal validity.32 While this case 
would more properly have been decided based on the British law that was 
in effect at the time the disputed title vested, it was instead decided on the 
newly asserted Discovery Doctrine, which established that “absolute title of 
the crown, [was] subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and 
recognize[d] the absolute title of the crown to extinguish that right.”33  
Aside from the decision’s blatant racism,34 Marshall’s analysis is also an 
ahistorical interpretation based on his own impression as the “first 
nationalist historian,”35 which merely echoed the American history he 
crafted for his book Life of George Washington.36 This repetition might be 
forgivable if it did not create the principals that “established and validated 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 51 (1996); United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“[S]tates where they are found are often [Indian tribes’] 
deadliest enemies.”). 
 30. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627 
(2006); see also AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 1:1-2 (2016). 
 31. Compare Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823) with Worcester 
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 517 (1832); see also Fletcher, supra note 30, at 661-62 
(citing LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 133 (2005)). 
 32. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 563. 
 33. Id.; Fletcher, supra note 30, at 634. 
 34. Nathan Goetting, The Marshall Trilogy and the Constitutional Dehumanization of 
American Indians, 65 GUILD PRAC. 207, 216 (2008). 
 35. Joshua L. Seifert, The Myth of Johnson v. M'intosh, 52 UCLA L. REV. 289, 302 
(2004). 
 36. Id. at 305-06 (quotation omitted). 
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the United States in America.”37 Unsurprisingly, this case has been the 
subject of much criticism by American Indian legal advocates.38 
Relying on the decision in Johnson, Georgia realized that the Cherokee 
Nation occupied much of its land mass and sought to attempt a mass 
eviction.39 The Cherokee Nation responded in turn by taking its battle to the 
federal courts, leading to the second case of the Marshall Trilogy, Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia.40 Prior to presenting its claim, however, the Cherokee 
Nation was stifled because the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction 
with cases involving a foreign state.41 The Court discussed Indian tribes as 
political quagmires—neither domestic nor foreign—before ultimately 
identifying them as domestic dependent sovereigns.42  
Having lost the ability to sue Georgia directly, the Cherokee Nation 
needed a new legal strategy that would avoid Marshall’s “sleight of hand” 
for avoiding legal controversies at that time.43 Ironically, missionaries 
would become the heroes of the Cherokee’s legal ambitions, as the 
governmental desire to remove the Tribe created a barrier to religious 
conversion.44 To aid in the Tribe’s efforts, Samuel Worcester, along with 
other missionaries, would challenge Georgia’s removal-oriented laws by 
living on Cherokee land without a license from the Governor of Georgia.45 
Predictably, Georgian authorities arrested, convicted, and sentenced 
Worcester to four years of manual labor.46 This was all a part of the plan, 
however, as Samuel Worcester and fellow defendant Elizur Butler refused 
pardons from Georgia in order to bring the final case in the Marshall 
Trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia.47  
This case gave Marshall a platform to undo the injustice he had 
originally caused through the Discovery Doctrine.48 The Chief Justice 
spoke plainly, as he mocked Georgia’s idea of title to Indian lands as, “[t]he 
extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements . . . acquired 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 306. 
 38. See generally id.  
 39. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 634 (quotation omitted). 
 40. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8 (1831). 
 41. Id. at 15-17. 
 42. Id.  
 43. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 113 
(7th ed. 2011).  
 44. Id. at 101. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544-45 (1832). 
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legitimate power . . . to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to 
sea.”49 He continued by asserting property rights of European discoverers 
had always been, “the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the 
natives were willing to sell.”50 Victory for Sam Worcester and the 
Cherokee Nation was—for the moment—secured when Marshall 
announced that “‘the laws of [a State] can have no force’ within reservation 
boundaries.”51 
Unfortunately, the Cherokee won the battle but lost the war, as Jackson 
would successfully initiate the Trail of Tears, removing more than 16,000 
Cherokee from Georgia to present-day Oklahoma.52 To add insult to injury, 
the legal ruling established in Worcester would be short lived, as the 
modern conception of tribal sovereignty “does not exclude all state 
regulatory authority on the reservation.”53 Indeed, history has repeated 
itself, as modern American Indian legal advocates still argue the issues of 
the Marshall Trilogy today.54 Seminole is an excellent example of this,55 but 
the Marshall Trilogy is far from the conclusion of relevant federal Indian 
legal history.  
2. The Indian Allotment Act of 1887: The Dawes Act 
Life for American Indians did not improve much by 1887, as the 
disposition of settler society had barely changed since the Jackson era.56 
The official federal policy became the manifestation of “kill the Indian, 
save the man” as taking Indian children from their families, forcing tribes 
onto reservations, and indoctrinating tribal communities into Western 
religion was merely the civilized thing to do.57 This atmosphere of hostility 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188, 201 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation omitted). 
 52. Getches et al., supra note 43, at 126. 
 53. E.g., Ward, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (citation omitted). 
 54. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 648. 
 55. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). 
 56. See Armen H. Merjian, An Unbroken Chain of Injustice: The Dawes Act, Native 
American Trusts, and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 609, 615 (2011). 
 57. See Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry into Law, Policy, and 
History, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 519, 523 (2013); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Law of the American 
West: A Critical Bibliography of the Nonlegal Sources, 85 MICH. L. REV. 953, 968 (1987) 
(“[V]iolent Indian-white conflicts led to the settlement of Indian tribes on 
reservations . . . .”); “Kill the Indian, and Save the Man”: Capt. Richard H. Pratt on the 
Education of Native Americans, HISTORY MATTERS: THE U.S. SURVEY COURSE ON THE WEB, 
http://history matters.gmu.edu/d/4929/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2015) (discussing that “kill the 
savage, and save the man” was the guiding philosophy behind federal government policy). 
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toward “Indianness” led Congress to view the communal conception of 
tribal land as the root barrier preventing “civilization” from coming to 
Indians.58 Thus Congress passed the Indian Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes 
Act) to separate communally held land from tribes and divide it into 
individual members’ possession.59  
While it is difficult to calculate the exact damage of the Dawes Act, a 
fair assessment would describe it as devastating.60 To start with, the 
allotments created by the Dawes Act undermined the tribes’ ability to 
achieve economic self-sufficiency by dividing tribal lands among individual 
Indians with the surplus sold to non-Indians.61 Consequently, the total land 
mass held by American Indians diminished by 86 million acres in less than 
fifty years; by 1934 tribes possessed less than fifty percent of their land 
holdings prior to the Dawes Act.62 By design, the Dawes Act targeted the 
land base intertwined with American Indian religion and successfully acted 
as “a mighty pulverizing engine for breaking up the tribal mass.”63  
Similar to the Marshall Trilogy, the Dawes Act created the conditions 
that make class III gaming even more necessary for Indians and their 
tribes.64 Economic development and self-sufficiency under the Dawes Act 
became nearly impossible for tribes as it functionally dissolved their 
governments during allotment.65 These negative effects are still felt today, 
as economists have noted allotment is one of the federal policies that drove 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See Wilkinson, supra note 57, at 965; JODI BYRD, TRANSIT OF EMPIRE xv-xvii 
(2011) (“[D]efinitions . . . of “Indianness” regulated and produced by U.S. settler 
imperialism . . . . created conditions of possibility for U. S. empire to manifest its intent.”); 
VINE DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 7 (2d ed. 1988) (describing allotment as “God's 
foreordained plan to repopulate the continent . . . with the goals of the tribes as they were 
defined by their white friends”). 
 59. Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 
629 (2009). 
 60. BYRD, supra note 58, at 159 (“[T]he Dawes Act [was] the primary source of the 
further impoverishment of native peoples and implicated allotment in increasing the rates of 
disease and infant mortality.”). 
 61. Pommersheim, supra note 57, at 520-22. 
 62. Id. at 522. 
 63. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 460-61 (1988) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Berger, supra note 59, at 629. 
 64. Mark D. Poindexter, Of Dinosaurs and Indefinite Land Trusts: A Review of 
Individual American Indian Property Rights Amidst the Legacy of Allotment, 14 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 53, 55 (1994). 
 65. Pommersheim, supra note 57, at 523. 
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the extreme poverty in modern Indian Country.66 It would take almost half 
a century for Congress to recognize the failure of the Dawes Act, and an 
alternative to allotment would not arrive until recommended by the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, in 1934.67  
3. The Indian Reorganization Act, or Our Mistake 
Since its conception, the purpose of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) 
has always been clear: “to end Federal policies of termination and allotment 
and begin an era of empowering tribes by restoring their homelands.”68 To 
accomplish this, the Act contained a number of provisions that made 
restoring and reconsolidating communally held tribal land a top priority.69 
For example, the IRA contained provisions that made the transfer of title to 
non-Indians nearly impossible and restored surplus lands to tribes, among 
other protections.70  
The IRA is not without criticism. Jodi Byrd, Professor of English and 
Gender Studies at the University of Illinois, states that the Act “sought to 
centralize tribal governance within a Western democratic structure in order 
to streamline the annuities paid to a tribe under treaty agreements and to 
effectively control land deals for non-native prospectors interested in 
natural resources and eventually nuclear-waste dumping.”71 Moreover, the 
IRA’s definition of a “tribe” differs widely from many American Indians’ 
definitions, as it consolidated many distinct tribes into larger political 
entities.72 For example, the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma are a 
single tribal entity to the federal government73, but citizens of the Tribe 
would likely disagree with that concept. 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See Randall K.Q. Akee et al., The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and Its Effects on 
American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 185, 188-89 (2015); see also 
The Indian Reorganization Act – 75 Years Later: Renewing Our Commitment to Restore 
Tribal Homelands and Promote Self-Determination: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Frederick Hoxie, History 
Professor, University of Illinois). 
 67. BYRD, supra note 58, at 159. 
 68. Hearings, supra note 66, at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Daniel Akaka, Chairman, 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs). 
 69. See G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri "Fix": Updating the Trust Land Acquisition 
Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 578 (2009). 
 70. Id. at 579-80. 
 71. BYRD, supra note 58, at 160. 
 72. DELORIA, supra note 58, at 16-17.  
 73. Id. 
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Taken together these criticisms demonstrate that the federal 
government’s road to hell is paved with good intentions as it has 
demonstrated an ineptitude to aid American Indians repeatedly.74 From a 
more pragmatic point of view, however, no single legislative act could undo 
the damage done to American Indians throughout the centuries, and the 
IRA remains a tribe’s primary mechanism for asserting sovereignty and 
achieving self-determination through the land-to-trust process.75 Moreover, 
its implications on Indian gaming are enormous as IGRA states that class 
III gaming “shall be lawful on Indian lands.”76 
B. The Creation of IGRA 
From the “Wind-Talkers” of World War II to the Termination Era in the 
1950s, the years between the enactment of the IRA in 1934 and the 
Cabazon decision in 1987 held many important milestones (both positive 
and negative) for American Indians;77 however, it would be the 1960s 
before Indian gaming as we know it would come into existence.78 In the 
early days, Indian gaming took the form of bingo halls, which worked as a 
means for tribes to generate money and reduce dependence on the federal 
government.79 Furthermore, many tribes were comfortable operating bingo 
halls without state approval because it was understood that “state laws have 
no force in Indian Country” at the time.80 As history progressed, more and 
more tribes caught onto the idea, and gaming began spreading across the 
country.81 It did not take long for states to take note and for legal clashes to 
begin, as tribes started looking to card games to generate more revenue.82 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Rice, supra note 69, at 589 (examining the general failure of the IRA to restore 
tribal land). 
 75. Pommersheim, supra note 57, at 520. 
 76. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-115). 
 77. See Bradford D. Cooley, The Navajo Uranium Ban: Tribal Sovereignty v. National 
Energy Demands, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393, 404-405 (2006); Robert 
Sandoval, Math 187: Introduction to Cryptography: Navajo Windtalkers, UC SAN DIEGO 
DEP’T OF MATH, http://math.ucsd.edu/~crypto/Projects/RobertoSandoval/NavajoWindtalk 
ers.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
 78. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 45. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 45; see McClatchey, supra note 6, at 1227. 
 81. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 45-46. 
 82. Id. at 45; see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 205 
(1987). 
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This scenario echoed across all of Indian Country and set the stage for one 
of the most celebrated cases in Indian gaming—Cabazon.83 
1. Cabazon v. California, or the Indians Win One 
By the mid-1980s, Indian gaming reached a tipping point as the Supreme 
Court heard arguments from the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission 
Indians against Riverside County, California.84 The issue revolved around 
whether California could enforce its statutory laws that prevented non-
charity based gambling on the Tribes’ reservations.85 California and the 
County were in a unique position to argue that jurisdiction would be proper 
because California had express authority from Congress to assert criminal 
and civil jurisdiction over Indian Country.86  
California’s congressional authority notwithstanding, the Supreme Court 
found for the Tribes.87 Specifically, the Supreme Court decided that 
Congress intended for California to have jurisdiction “over private civil 
litigation involving reservation Indians in state court, but not to grant 
general civil regulatory authority.”88 The Court further recognized that to 
grant the state the broad civil authority it sought “would result in the 
destruction of tribal institutions and values.”89 With all of this taken 
together, the Court decided that if California regulates rather than prohibits 
gaming, then the conduct is distinct from the general criminal or specific 
civil jurisdiction that Congress granted to certain states with regard to 
Indian Country, and thus the regulation would not apply.90 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that state laws only apply to Indian Country “if 
Congress has expressly so provided.”91  
The tribes were victorious, if only briefly. Cabazon marked “a new era 
of judicially approved Indian gaming, [and] sparked previously unseen 
economic development on tribal lands.”92 Congress, however, would not 
merely step aside for unregulated Indian gaming to come to fruition and 
instead opted to pass the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 83. E.g., Brown, supra note 27. 
 84. California, 480 U.S. at 204. 
 85. Id. at 205-07. 
 86. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 47. 
 87. California, 480 U.S. at 222.  
 88. Id. at 208 (citation omitted). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 209-11. 
 91. Id. at 207. 
 92. Brown, supra note 27, at 163. 
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2. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or The Double-Edged Sword 
Although Congress debated gaming regulations for many years,93 there 
was never substantial progress for a coherent piece of legislation to address 
Indian gaming. In a fit of irony, the Cabazon decision created congressional 
momentum for regulating Indian gaming by creating a beacon for lobbyists 
of commercial gaming, religious organizations, and the “anti-Indian gaming 
effort” within Congress. 94 With speed, usually unknown to Congress, 
IGRA passed in a little over a year after the Cabazon decision.95 
The Act itself, in many ways, operates as a doubled-edged sword. On 
one side, it solidified the ruling in Cabazon that tribes could operate the 
same types of games that states allowed elsewhere.96 The Act also provided 
clarification in the way gaming shall proceed into the future by creating 
three classes of gaming, and establishing rules for each class.97 On the other 
hand, IGRA also increased federal regulation of gaming by creating the 
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), and required tribes to 
negotiate with states to conduct class III gaming, among other things.98 
From that point on, Indian gaming would progress as business as usual 
within Indian Country for the better half of a decade, until Florida refused 
to negotiate.99  
III. The De Facto Federal Circuit Split 
A. The Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 
1. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
After the Cabazon decision, there was not another major redefinition of 
Indian gaming by the Supreme Court until Seminole. The story is 
straightforward enough; the State of Florida refused to negotiate with the 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Franklin Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Background and 
Legislative History, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99, 112 (2010). 
 94. Id. at 160; Washburn, supra note 5, at 428. 
 95. Compare Ducheneuax, supra note 93, at 169 (“The bill was signed into law by the 
President on October 17, 1988.”), with California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 
U.S. 202 (1987) (decided on February 25, 1987). 
 96. Washburn, supra note 5, at 428. 
 97. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012); see Washburn, supra note 5, at 50-52; see also Fletcher, 
supra note 9, at 51 (describing that class I gaming is traditional tribal games or gaming that 
would be regulated by Indian tribes, class II gaming is high-stakes bingo, and class III 
gaming is all other gaming). 
 98. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 51-52. 
 99. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 52 (1996). 
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Seminole Tribe of Florida (Seminoles) for class III gaming.100 This led to 
the Seminoles filing suit in 1991.101 After a series of appeals, the Supreme 
Court decided the case on March 27, 1996.102 There were two main claims 
forwarded by the Seminoles.103 First, the Tribe claimed that the Indian 
Commerce Clause, in conjunction with Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 
meant that Congress had the authority to abrogate sovereign immunity of 
the states with regard to IGRA.104 Second, the Seminoles argued that in the 
event Congress could not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, then the 
tribe could sue the Governor of Florida directly for injunctive relief, relying 
on the Court’s decision in Ex parte Young.105 The Seminoles lost both 
claims in a 5-4 decision.106  
The divided Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 
announcing that Congress in fact did not have the ability to abrogate states’ 
sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.107 Furthermore, 
tribes could not use an Ex parte Young action to sue the governor of a state 
for violating IGRA, because Congress’s intent was for tribes to sue states 
directly, which foreclosed Ex parte Young actions.108 Consequently, tribes 
are at the mercy of states under IGRA,109 as states following Seminole 
require massive legal and economic concessions to even initiate 
negotiations.110 And, if a tribe successfully negotiates a compact with a 
state the negotiated terms or concessions could be interpreted as a state tax, 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 51. 
 102. Id. at 44. 
 103. Id. at 47. 
 104. Id. at 60. 
 105. Id. at 73. 
 106. Id. at 76. 
 107. Id. at 108. 
 108. Id. at 74-76; see Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and 
the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 511 (1997) (“Under 
Ex parte Young, a suit to secure future compliance with federal law, brought against a state 
officer, is not regarded as one against the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.”). 
 109. Ducheneaux, supra note 93, at 177 (“This decision upset the delicate balance 
Congress had adopted in the Tribal-State Compact provision and, as feared by Congress, put 
the tribes at the mercy of states in compact negotiations.”). 
 110. Cunniff, supra note 14, at 531 (“Congress's findings upon enacting the legislation 
reflected the spirit of the self-determination era and the promise of gaming for tribal 
economic development.”); see also S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 1-2 (1988); see also Fletcher, 
supra note 9, at 42 (discussing how bargaining power heavily favored the states over tribes).  
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which IGRA forbids, rendering the compact void.111 Today these issues 
remain, and dissecting the flaws of Seminole reveal the frustration 
American Indian legal advocates have with these decisions and 
demonstrates the necessity of the Class III Gaming Procedures. 
Be forewarned, attempting to unravel this decision results in many 
perplexing observations. First, why has Congress not fixed the loophole for 
states to block class III gaming created by Seminole?112 Moreover, while 
the Supreme Court referenced the legislative intent of IGRA,113 it 
overlooked the intent of the Chairman of House Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Morris Udall, when he stated that, “I would expect that the Federal courts, 
in any litigation arising out of this legislation, would apply the Supreme 
Court's time-honoring rule of construction that ambiguities in legislation 
enacted for the benefit of Indians will be construed in their favor.”114  
Certainly, a 5-4 decision demonstrates that there was ambiguity in 
IGRA’s application,115 but nowhere in the decision does it appear that the 
majority knew the canons of construction existed.116 Frustration quickly 
ensued as Udall’s statement illustrated that Congress intended the Supreme 
Court to resolve any ambiguity, and the Supreme Court, in turn, replied, “If 
that effort is to be made, it should be made by Congress.”117 This criticism 
is far from isolated, as one only needs to look to the dissent—more than 
three times the length of the majority opinion—to find further fault.118 
It makes sense to begin with the first critic of the case, Justice Stevens.119 
“This case is about power” he began,120 setting a stern tone toward the 
majority. Justice Stevens sought to persuade the Court that the Constitution 
does not cement states sovereign immunity in “all cases.”121 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                 
 111. 25 U.S.C.A § 2710(d)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-114 (excluding Pub, L. 
No. 114-94, 114-95 and 114-113)); Fletcher, supra note 9, at 42-43. 
 112. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEV. L.J. 
285, 289 n.19 (2004) (“[B]ecause the issue is fraught with such political peril - one or more 
important constituency will be angered by any significant amendment to the law - Congress 
has since been unable to seriously re-examine its legislation.”). 
 113. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996). 
 114. Ducheneaux, supra note 93, at 169. 
 115. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
100 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 116. See generally id. at 57-76. 
 117. Compare Ducheneaux, supra note 93, at 169, with Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. 
at 76.  
 118. Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 44-76, with id. at 76-185. 
 119. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 82. 
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majority misunderstood the precedent they relied on, as sovereign immunity 
is more fluid than they conceived.122 In an effort to demonstrate the error of 
the Court’s decision, Justice Stevens turned to the consequences of 
Seminole, claiming that this case would set a precedent barring a broad-
range of citizen claims against their own state, including everything from 
environmental to bankruptcy, copyright, and patent laws.123 Despite his 
dissent, Justice Stevens remained optimistic by concluding that the tribe 
still had the procedures established in IGRA124—the predecessor to Class 
III Gaming Procedures—and he was confident that “Justice Souter’s far 
wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day.”125 
As to be expected, Justice Souter’s dissent was no more forgiving than 
Justice Stevens’ was. Joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice 
Souter initiated his argument by observing that the Court held “for the first 
time since the founding of the Republic that Congress has no authority to 
subject a State to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an 
individual asserting a federal right.”126 First, he critiqued the majority’s 
conclusion by demonstrating that within the Constitutional Framers’ intent 
there is “no record that anyone argued . . . the Constitution would 
affirmatively guarantee state sovereign immunity against any congressional 
action to the contrary.”127 Echoing Justice Stevens’ dissent, Justice Souter’s 
textual reading of the Constitution reveals that out of the plausible readings 
of the Eleventh Amendment, barring actions of a citizen against their own 
state is not one of them, and thus the majority was misled in Seminole.128  
Any discussion of tribes’ special legal status within the United States 
struck like lightening—and disappeared as quickly—in Justice Souter’s 
concise argument about tribal sovereignty.129 Specifically, the majority’s 
view on state sovereign immunity comes into direct conflict with the 
Court’s rulings in Cabazon that states lack the power to regulate gaming.130 
Furthermore, other cases (such as Worcester) held that only the federal 
government had authority within Indian Country.131 Taken together, these 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 83 (“[I]t was by no means a fixed view at the time of the founding that Article 
III prevented Congress from rendering States suable in federal court by their own citizens.”). 
 123. Id. at 77. 
 124. Id. at 99. 
 125. Id. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 106. 
 128. Id. at 114-15. 
 129. Id. at 147-49. 
 130. Id. at 148. 
 131. Id. at 147 n.40 (Souter, Ginsberg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
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conventional rules of federal Indian law demonstrate that the majority’s 
opinion functionally ignored the special status that tribes hold within 
American jurisprudential history.132 In summation, Justice Souter 
concluded that, “States have no sovereignty in the regulation of commerce 
with the tribes, [thus] there is no source of sovereign immunity to assert in a 
suit based on congressional regulation of that commerce.”133 
Hopefully, these arguments give an adequate sampling of the frustration 
American Indian legal advocates hold with regard to the Seminole decision. 
While more could be dedicated to the decision’s flaws, it would not change 
the fact that Seminole remains “good” law.134 Further discussion of the case 
would be useful only as an academic exercise; thus legal analysis would be 
better served by fixing the “gap in IGRA” created by Seminole.135 Luckily, 
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Seminole provides the genesis and 
legitimacy of the Class III Gaming Procedures necessary to accomplish that 
goal.136 
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision, or “The Answer . . . Is Simple”137  
It may seem odd to discuss the Eleventh Circuit analysis of Seminole 
after the Supreme Court’s decision, but it was actually the Eleventh Circuit 
that planted the seeds for the Class III Gaming Procedures.138 For the most 
part, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision follows the same general legal analysis 
as the Supreme Court139 and does not warrant repetition.140 While both 
courts’ held that the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prevented 
tribes from suing states under IGRA, the Eleventh Circuit—near the end of 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. at 148. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Tohono O'odham Nation v. Ducey, No. CV-15-01135-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 
5475290, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 17, 2015). 
 135. Santee Sioux Nation v. Norton, No. 8:05CV147, 2006 WL 2792734, at *5 (D. Neb. 
Sept. 26, 2006). 
 136. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As the Court of 
Appeals interpreted the Act, this final disposition is available even though the action against 
the State and its Governor may not be maintained.”). 
 137. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 517 
U.S. 44 (1996). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Compare generally Seminole Tribe of Fla., 11 F.3d 1016 with Seminole Tribe of 
Fla., 517 U.S. 44. 
 140. See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla., 11 F.3d at 1029. 
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its opinion—noted that it was comfortable reaching that decision because it 
believed tribes did not need the federal courts for relief.141  
In short, the Eleventh Circuit’s comfort came from the belief that the 
Secretary always had the power to propagate the Class III Gaming 
Procedures.142 The Court decided that, “[i]f the state pleads an Eleventh 
Amendment defense . . . . The Secretary then may prescribe regulations 
governing class III gaming on the tribe’s lands.”143 The decision went so far 
as to state that such regulations were justified under “IGRA and serves to 
achieve Congress’ goals.”144 Nevertheless, even with authorization from a 
federal circuit court of appeals, the Class III Gaming Procedures remain far 
from legally solidified,145 as the Supreme Court did “not tell us whether it 
agrees or disagrees with that disposition.”146  
Given the implications of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding, it is not exactly 
clear why the Supreme Court would not address that portion of the opinion 
directly. Even Justice Stevens noted that it was unwise for the Supreme 
Court not to review the power the Eleventh Circuit recognized within the 
Secretary.147 Regardless of Supreme Court’s reasoning, it would appear that 
Justices Stevens’ concerns were justified, because federal courts remain in 
disarray with regard to the Class III Gaming Procedures.148  
3. The Decade After Seminole  
Following the decision in Seminole, the Secretary of the Interior took the 
Eleventh Circuit on its word, and in 1999 propagated the Class III Gaming 
Procedures.149 Since then, Class III Gaming Procedures have remained a 
hot button issue,150 but most states and tribes are willing to work through 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 65. 
 146. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 99 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. (“In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable 
involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in 
the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power.”). 
 148. Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla., 11 F.3d at 1029, with Texas v. United States, 497 
F.3d 491, 511 (5th Cir. 2007); see Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 
605 (Fla. 2008) (discussing that the Class III Gaming Procedures “validity remains 
questionable”). 
 149. 25 C.F.R. § 291.1 (1999). 
 150. Cunniff, supra note 14, at 548. 
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the negotiation process and establish gaming compacts pursuant to IGRA 
for a variety of reasons.151  
Realistically, many modern tribes and states have amicable relationships 
that make compact negotiations non-issues.152 In many cases, the tribes and 
states negotiate over material that would be mutually beneficial, such as a 
revenue sharing in exchange for exclusive gaming rights for tribes.153 
Consequently, in cases where both sides feel benefited, litigation would be 
unlikely to result.  
Additionally, economic theory offers another explanation for why 
litigating the Class III Gaming Procedures is rare—the risk and cost of 
litigation. More specifically, litigation is an economic disincentive,154 
because of its cost, the arbitrary probability of winning,155 and the 
magnitude of losing complete authority over class III gaming have a 
negative impact on potential litigators.156 This economic disincentive, in 
turn, results in tacit collusion.157 Unlike a legal definition of collusion, tacit 
collusion does not require explicit communication for a desired result, but 
rather results when it is economically beneficial for both actors to engage in 
certain conduct they would not otherwise engage in.158 As applied to the 
Class III Gaming Procedures, the tribe and state are the actors, and both 
benefit from negotiating class III gaming compacts (colluding). 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Fletcher, supra note 9, at 81-82. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Tribal Gaming Compact, Oklahoma-Cherokee Nation, at 22-23 (2004). 
 154. See Mireille Kingma, Economic Incentive in Community Nursing: Attraction, 
Rejection or Indifference?, PMC: U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED. (Apr. 14, 2003), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC166116/ (reprint from Human Resources for 
Health, vol. 1, no. 2) (“An economic disincentive is the absence of adequate payment or 
concession, or its withdrawal, thus discouraging action or effort in work.”); see also Laurel 
Hudson & Paul Bloom, Potential Consumer Research Contributions to Combating Drinking 
and Driving Problems, ASS’N FOR CONSUMER RESEARCH, http://www.acrwebsite. 
org/search/view-conference-proceedings.aspx?Id=6330 (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (reprint 
of 11 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 676 (1984)) (defining economic disincentive as 
“tangible punishments for performing certain behaviors”). 
 155. Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(noting that IGRA permits the Secretary of the Interior to circumvent non-negotiating states) 
with Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 511 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that IGRA does not 
permit the Secretary of the Interior to circumvent non-negotiating states). 
 156. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 11 F.3d at 1029; see Texas, 497 F.3d at 511. 
 157. Marc Ivaldi et al., The Economics of Tacit Collusion, in FINAL REPORT FOR DG 
COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 4-5 (Mar. 2003), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf. 
 158. Id. at 4 n.2. 
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Accordingly, both also understand that “any deviation from the collusive 
path would trigger some retaliation,” in this case, litigation.159 
Realistically, many economic theories run the risk of having bias created 
by the analyzer’s desired result rather than objectively representing the 
world as it exists.160 Despite this admission, the conditions seem to 
accurately represent an economic disincentive resulting in collusion, as the 
cost, arbitrary nature, and risk of litigation is too great for most rational 
actors to attempt.161 Moreover, because litigation is so “likely and costly [it 
outweighs] the short-term benefits from ‘cheating’ on the collusive path,” 
and tacit collusion results.162  
While the Class III Gaming Procedures have not gone off without a 
hitch, tacit collusion—at least partially—explains why litigation in the 
decade following Seminole never reached fruition.163 Unfortunately, Texas 
would prove that not all states follow the same rationale.164 
B. Texas v. United States 
It would take a decade for any substantive judgment about the Class III 
Gaming Procedures to arrive, but the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas 
(Kickapoo) actually started pursuing class III gaming in 1995.165 
Subsequently, the Kickapoo filed suit, but after years of litigation, the case 
was eventually dismissed pursuant to the Seminole decision.166 In 2004, the 
Kickapoo initiated the Class III Gaming Procedures to conduct class III 
gaming, and Texas filed this suit in order to challenge the legitimacy of the 
regulations.167 
In this case, the Fifth Circuit based its substantive analysis of the Class 
III Gaming Procedures via the Chevron doctrine.168 Under Chevron, a 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. at 5. 
 160. Fabrizio Ferraro et al., Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories Can 
Become Self-Fulfilling, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 8, 12 (2005) (“[T]he assumptions and ideas of 
economics come to create a world in which the ideas are true because, through their effect 
on actions and decisions, they produce a world that corresponds to the assumptions and ideas 
themselves.”). 
 161. Compare Texas, 497 F.3d at 511 with Seminole Tribe of Fla., 11 F.3d at 1029; supra 
note 154. 
 162. Ivaldi et al., supra note 157, at 5. 
 163. See Alabama v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1324 (S.D. Ala. 2008). 
 164. See Texas, 497 F.3d 491. 
 165. Id. at 495. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 501. 
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regulation—such as the Class III Gaming Procedures—is justified if “(1) a 
statute is ambiguous or silent concerning the scope of secretarial authority 
and (2) the regulations reasonably flow from the statute when viewed in 
context of the overall legislative framework and the policies that animated 
Congress's design.”169 
Analyzing the first prong of Chevron as applied to IGRA, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the text of IGRA “is clear and unambiguous,” and moved 
on to the second prong.170 The Court then turned to address the question 
that often divides federal courts;171 whether Seminole created the conditions 
necessary for IGRA to be interpreted as ambiguous.172 The Fifth Circuit 
responded to that claim by stating, “neither the agency nor the courts are 
free to assume that Congress intended the Secretary to act in situations left 
unspoken.”173 In a flippant manner, the court seems to decide that Congress 
should predict all possible Supreme Court decisions ahead of time, despite 
the impossibility of such a task.174  
When addressing the second prong of the Chevron analysis, the Fifth 
Circuit stated that even if the Class III Gaming Procedures satisfied the first 
prong of Chevron, they would have still failed because they “do not 
reasonably effectuate Congress's intent for IGRA,” to give the states 
authority over Indian gaming. 175 Consequently, the Class III Gaming 
Procedures “stand in direct violation of IGRA.”176 In concluding, the Fifth 
Circuit addressed the argument that, in the alternative, the Secretary had 
been delegated the power to propagate regulations for federal Indian law 
due to the general trust relationships tribes have with the United States 
government.177 The court responded to that contention by stating that 
Congress delegated to the Secretary the power to prescribe “regulations that 
implement ‘specific laws,’ and that are consistent with other relevant 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (quotation omitted). 
 171. E.g., New Mexico v. Dep't of the Interior, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1212 (D.N.M. 
2014) (“Texas v. United States . . . is less persuasive on this point, since only one judge on 
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 172. Texas, 497 F.3d at 503. 
 173. Id. at 502. 
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federal legislation,”178 which was the Secretary’s intention behind the Class 
III Gaming Procedures. Regardless, the regulations were ruled invalid.179 
Still, this judgment was not unanimous, as Judge Carolyn King 
concurred with majority conclusion although disagreeing that IGRA was 
unambiguous following Seminole.180 Judge King found common ground 
with majority opinion in agreeing that the Secretary had exceeded her 
power by “creating an alternative remedial scheme that allows the Secretary 
to issue Class III gaming procedures without Congress's chosen 
prerequisites . . . goes beyond the mere effectuation of IGRA's provisions 
into the realm of wholesale statutory amendment.”181 More specifically, 
Judge King noted that by omitting the federal court determination of bad 
faith from the Class III Gaming Procedures “the Secretary's method fails to 
preserve the core safeguards by which state interests are protected in 
Congress's ‘carefully crafted and intricate remedial scheme.’”182 It is 
noteworthy, however, that the concurrence had a more sympathetic tone 
than the majority, as Judge King stated that the Class III Gaming 
Procedures existed “for understandable reasons,” and following Seminole 
states had an “unforeseen and unintended ability to prevent the necessary 
court involvement.” 183 Thus, while the majority carries the day in Texas, 
other courts have found the lack of solidity less persuasive,184 which is why 
the dissent in this case is so noteworthy. 
Judge James Dennis took a hardline against the majority,185 stating that if 
“circumstances imply that Congress would expect an agency to be able to 
speak with the force of law, even though Congress may not have expressly 
delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision, a 
reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency's exercise of its 
generally conferred authority.”186 Furthermore, the argument that Seminole 
“created” the ambiguity in IGRA, rather than Congress, misconstrues the 
function of the judiciary, as the “prevailing view is that the judicial power 
vested in the federal courts allows them to declare what the law already is, 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. at 510. 
 179. Id. at 511. 
 180. Id. (King, J., Concurring). 
 181. Id. at 512. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. New Mexico v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 1:14-CV-00695-JAP/SC, 2014 WL 
10298035, at *11 (D.N.M. Sept. 11, 2014). 
 185. Texas, 497 F.3d at 513 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
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rather than to create new law as the Chief Judge's argument presupposes 
that the Court did in Seminole.”187 Judge Dennis skillfully continued to 
layer his argument by illustrating that it is impossible for Seminole to create 
the gap in IGRA, as the Supreme Court decisions do not create law, but 
rather recognize the “controlling interpretation of federal law” that always 
existed.188 And, this is the prevailing view of other circuit courts that have 
applied the Chevron doctrine.189 For all of those reasons, the Class III 
Gaming Procedures within the context of IGRA would properly fulfill the 
first prong of the Chevron doctrine.190 
As for the second prong of Chevron, Judge Dennis noted that IGRA is 
not limited to the states’ interest because its explicit purpose was to 
promote “tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal 
governments.”191 Additionally, the notion that Congress must foresee an 
ambiguity within their own statute beforehand is “unpersuasive and 
circular” to Judge Dennis.192 He further notes that, “[i]t is inherent in the 
policymaking process that some unforeseen event, or ‘case unprovided for,’ 
could render a portion of a statute ambiguous or meaningless.”193 
Judge Dennis continues his assault beyond the Chevron doctrine by 
addressing the general legal theories and arguments of the majority.194 For 
example, he explained that the Class III Gaming Procedures do not 
eliminate the federal courts from the compact process. In fact, a state must 
invoke a federal court by raising an Eleventh Amendment defense to 
dismiss the case before the Class III Gaming Procedures.195 Judge Dennis 
also observed that even if the Secretary of the Interior under IGRA was not 
authorized to propagate the Class III Gaming Procedures, Congress 
delegated the necessary power when it codified that the Secretary has the 
power to “prescribe such regulations as he [or she] may think fit for 
carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian 
affairs.”196 There is nothing to suggest, however, that IGRA diminished the 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. at 515. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 516. 
 190. Id. at 517. 
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power that the Secretary has possessed since the Marshall Trilogy.197 In 
conclusion, Judge Dennis states that the Fifth Circuit has “no business 
rejecting the Secretary's exercise of his generally conferred authority.”198  
While not mentioned in Judge Dennis’ dissent, it is striking that the Fifth 
Circuit only quickly references the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Seminole 
in a footnote,199 as the decision concerns the Secretarial power to propagate 
regulations and is directly related and responsive to the arguments in 
Texas.200 For example, the majority in Texas ironically stated, “The 
Eleventh Circuit has suggested without any analysis that if a state asserted 
Eleventh Amendment immunity against a tribe's lawsuit, the judicial good-
faith determination was severable.”201 But when weighed and measured, the 
Fifth Circuit is the only court lacking analysis, as the Eleventh Circuit 
highlighted that IGRA’s “explicit severability clause” would allow the 
severance of parts of IGRA that were “held invalid.”202 Within this context, 
the Eleventh Circuit clearly established that severing part of IGRA was 
necessary to resolve the gap created when “an Indian tribe faced with a 
state that not only will not negotiate in good faith, but also will not consent 
to suit.”203 Yet, the Fifth Circuit attempts to claim that, “Nowhere does the 
Eleventh Circuit claim that a state's exercise of Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity creates a statutory gap,”204 when the analysis of the gap 
created by Seminole (as quoted above) is the justification for enacting the 
severability clause of IGRA.205  
All of this taken together demonstrates that Judge Dennis is not alone in 
his frustration with the majority opinion, as others have found similar flaws 
with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas.206 Some even contend that the 
decision threatens the whole Indian gaming industry since it reaffirms the 
fears of Seminole,207 but that has not proven to be the case just yet.208 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Cunniff, supra note 14, at 543-44. 
 198. Texas, 497 F.3d at 525 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id. at 503 n.10 (Jones, C.J.). 
 200. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 201. Texas, 497 F.3d at 503 n.10. 
 202. 25 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012); Seminole Tribe of Fla., 11 F.3d at 1029. 
 203. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 11 F.3d at 1029.  
 204. Texas, 497 F.3d at 503 n.10. 
 205. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 11 F.3d at 1029. 
 206. Cunniff, supra note 14, at 548 (“The court failed to find any ambiguity in the IGRA 
statute despite it being fundamentally altered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Seminole. The 
court also failed to see a link between Congress's desire to enable tribal Class III gaming and 
the Secretarial Procedures.”).  
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
348 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
 
 
C. Federal Courts Since Texas v. United States 
In the wake of Texas, the Secretary has not given up on the Class III 
Gaming Procedures,209 and federal courts are far from unanimous on their 
validity.210 While the Fifth Circuit’s decision certainly influences other 
federal judges’ decisions,211 its reception has not been overwhelmingly 
warm.212 For example, in Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of 
Rincon Reservation v. Schwarzenegger (Rincon), Judge Jay Bybee of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) does not appear to have 
much confidence in the Fifth Circuit’s holding.213 He noted that the Class 
III Gaming Procedures were “hardly a settled issue,”214 and a divided Fifth 
Circuit has done little to deter the Department of the Interior.215 Judge 
Bybee further stated that “no other circuit court—including the Second, 
Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits (home to Connecticut, Michigan, New 
Mexico and Oklahoma, and Florida, respectively)—has held the Part 291 
regulations to be invalid.”216 It is also telling that Judge Bybee’s criticism is 
found in a ruling that does not address the Class III Gaming Procedures,217 
which seems to indicate that he is eager to attend to the issue. 
The lower federal district courts have not been much more forgiving of 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision.218 For example, in Alabama v. United States, 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama heard 
arguments for the Department of the Interior’s motion for summary 
judgment regarding the Class III Gaming Procedures.219 In this case, 
Alabama sought to block the Poarch Band of Creek Indians (Poarch Band) 
from invoking the Class III Gaming Procedures.220  
This case had striking similarities to Texas, as a state was attempting to 
block the Class III Gaming Procedures before Secretary made a final 
                                                                                                                 
 208. E.g. Alabama v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1331 (S.D. Ala. 2008). 
 209. Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Rincon Reservation v. Schwarzenegger, 
602 F.3d 1019, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. 
 211. New Mexico v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 1:14-CV-00695-JAP, 2014 WL 10298036, 
at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 17, 2014). 
 212. See Rincon Band, 602 F.3d at 1073 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 213. See id. 
 214. Id. at 1073 n.27.  
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See id. at 1026. 
 218. See, e.g., Alabama v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1331 (S.D. Ala. 2008). 
 219. Id. at 1324-25. 
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determination.221 The Southern District Court of Alabama, however, 
granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment.222 In reaching its 
decision, the court substantively referenced Texas while discussing ripeness 
and concluded, “whatever extent Texas represents a supportable alternative 
view, the Court rejects it in favor of the clear majority position.”223 Because 
ripeness was the basis of granting summary judgment in this case, the Fifth 
Circuit and the Southern District Court of Alabama are at opposite ends of 
the table, at least with regard to determining when final agency action has 
occurred,224 and at most with the Class III Gaming Procedures at large.225  
It is also noteworthy that while the Southern District Court of Alabama 
falls within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit, the District Court made 
no mention that the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Seminole was the source of 
the Class III Gaming Procedures.226 One can only speculate at their 
reasoning—perhaps to preserve a veil of objectivity—but regardless, the 
Southern District Court of Alabama’s decision reaffirms the Eleventh 
Circuit finding that the Secretary had the power to propagate the Class III 
Gaming Procedures.227  
Even when a federal district court does follow the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Texas, it is not without criticism.228 In New Mexico v. 
Department of the Interior, the story was much the same as Texas and 
Alabama.229 The Pueblo of Pojoaque (Pojoaque) sought to conduct class III 
gaming, and New Mexico did not want to engage in compact negotiation.230 
The Pojoaque wanted to use the Class III Gaming Procedures propagated 
by the Secretary of the Interior and New Mexico sued.231 In this case, 
unlike Alabama, the United States District Court of the District of New 
Mexico followed the ruling in Texas finding that the Class III Gaming 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Id. at 1330-31. 
 222. Id. at 1332. 
 223. Id. at 1331. 
 224. Id. at 1330-31. 
 225. Compare generally Alabama, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1320 with Texas v. United States, 
497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 226. See generally Alabama, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 1323.  
 227. Compare Alabama, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 1323 with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 
11 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 228. New Mexico v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 1:14-CV-00695-JAP, 2014 WL 10298036, 
at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 17, 2014). 
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Procedures were invalid under IGRA.232 This recent holding certainly is 
worrisome, as it demonstrated that the Fifth Circuit was not in complete 
isolation in its reasoning.233  
Despite this, the District Court of New Mexico was not without 
criticism.234 For example, the majority in New Mexico disagreed with the 
majority in Texas that the Class III Gaming Procedures subject Texas to the 
jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior, but still found that New 
Mexico had standing.235 Moreover, the court also observed, “the persuasive 
value of Texas is diminished by the fact that only one judge (Chief Judge 
Jones) on the three-judge panel concluded that IGRA was unambiguous.”236 
Realistically, differences in the majorities’ analysis in Texas and New 
Mexico are mostly dicta—far from Earth shattering—but they do signal that 
federal courts that are willing to strike down the Class III Gaming 
procedures are not solidified in their reasoning, which is a fracture left to be 
exploited.  
D. Walking On: Legal Arguments for the Class III Gaming Procedures 
As time rolls on, federal courts are still taking up class III gaming cases 
and deciding how compact negotiations are going to be resolved.237 And 
because federal courts remain divided on the Class III Gaming Procedures, 
the best method for constructing future arguments will be to revisit the 
previously mentioned cases and the future cases to be decided. There 
certainly are lessons from majorities, concurrences, and dissents that 
American Indian legal advocates, policy makers, and judges should 
consider when constructing their arguments and decisions. For example, 
while tribes lost Texas, the dissent and concurrence both offer arguments 
that can be built upon to defend the Class III Gaming Procedure in other 
federal courts.238 One could go on with examples, but the purpose is to 
demonstrate that while some dismiss the Class III Gaming Procedures (as 
with much of federal Indian law) as dying a slow death after Texas,239 
nothing is final until the Supreme Court makes a ruling. 
                                                                                                                 
 232. Id. at *14. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. Id. at *6-*7. 
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IV. Policy Arguments Concerning the Class III Gaming Procedures 
Regardless of personal views of the Class III Gaming Procedures, it is 
clear that the regulations did not occur within a political vacuum; rather, 
they were the Secretary’s response to the perceived need that tribes would 
face following Seminole.240 Undoubtedly, political opinions are tenacious, 
but by exploring the policy implications of the Class III Gaming 
Procedures, political opinions may change. Moreover, tribal sovereignty 
has historically been a bipartisan issue,241 and—to the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s displeasure242—politics often influence Supreme Court 
decisions.243 
A. States’ Rights v. Equity 
It is often ignored that originally states had no right to regulate Indian 
gaming.244 But much has changed, and today at the heart of any discussion 
of IGRA and the Class III Gaming Procedures are states’ rights.245 Indeed, 
it is hardly an avoidable issue, as the Supreme Court in Seminole based its 
decision on a state’s right to sovereign immunity.246 Even more than 200 
years since the conception of the United States, the judiciary is still 
resolving where tribal sovereignty ends and states’ rights begin.247 With all 
of that said there are particularized policy reasons that the Class III Gaming 
Procedures are necessary to ensure equity between the tribes and states and 
are key to ensure IGRA’s intent with regard to states’ rights.  
As discussed earlier, Cabazon greatly reduced states’ ability to regulate 
Indian gaming until the passage of IGRA.248 This action on the part of 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. at 534.  
 241. Indian Gaming: The Next 25 Years: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 7 (2014) (statement of Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary 
of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Interior). 
 242. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Judges 
are selected precisely for their skill as lawyers; whether they reflect the policy views of a 
particular constituency is not (or should not be) relevant.”). 
 243. JAMES MIDGLEY & MICHELLE LIVEMORE, THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL POLICY 34 
(2008). 
 244. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 990 So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Fla. 2008). 
 245. E.g., Lindner-Cornelius, supra note 23. 
 246. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). 
 247. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997). 
 248. See Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington State, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1994), 
cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Washington v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 517 U.S. 
1129 (1996) (“The IGRA was passed to fill a void in Indian gaming regulation that arose 
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Congress has multiple policy implications. For instance, with states 
lobbying, Congress required compacts for class III gaming.249 Moreover, 
the language of IGRA seems to indicate that Congress conceives of Indian 
Country as being “located in a State,” as delegating power to states would 
be nonsensical otherwise.250 
Despite any ethical objection, general policy concerns support state 
jurisdictional control, as it is difficult to conceptualize many sovereign 
nations existing within America.251 And from a practical stand point, 
policing would be extremely difficult (if not impossible) with a patchwork 
of sovereign nations located so closely together252—although Europe seems 
to manage. The policy interests within IGRA demonstrate that the 
legislation was drafted with state protection in mind, but that does not mean 
that state interests should be all that matter. 
United States House Representative Morris Udall spoke about IGRA 
with intent to protect Indian interests in the face of a powerful states’ 
lobby.253 If nothing else, this demonstrates that Indian interests were not 
isolated from the bill in its conception—Fifth Circuit notwithstanding.254 
Nevertheless, that leaves IGRA in a policy conundrum as both parties 
interests are opposing255.  
IGRA’s delegation of power to the states does offer a resolution to this 
paradox, however, as States have never had an inherent power to intervene 
in tribal affairs—consider Worcester v. Georgia. Consequently, the waiver 
of sovereign immunity granted in IGRA is not an abrogation of inherent 
power within the states, but rather a condition placed on the delegated 
power.256 A less abstract explanation is that if Congress can take a power 
away from a state, then it, by definition, is not inherent.257 This seems to be 
consistent with federal Indian legal theory at large as the Ninth Circuit used 
                                                                                                                 
from the states' dependence on Congress for any authority to regulate tribal affairs.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 249. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Bryan T. Andersen, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe: Sewing A Patchwork 
Quilt of Jurisdiction, 3 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 99, 110 (1998). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Ducheneaux, supra note 93, at 169. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Compare Ducheneaux, supra note 93, at 169, with Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 
491, 506 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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this same analysis—echoing the Eleventh Circuit—justifying the Secretary 
of the Interior’s ability to propagate regulations in response to Seminole.258 
B. Department of the Interior Objectivity 
It is undoubtedly true that the Department of the Interior, acting on 
behalf of the Executive branch, carries the fiduciary duties of the United 
States federal government as the guardian of the numerous American Indian 
tribes within the continental United States.259 This is not merely to 
document a well-known fact, but to point out that the particular relationship 
the Department of the Interior has with tribes has caused some speculation 
about its ability to act as both guardian and objective adjudicator of the 
Class III Gaming Procedures.260 It is even arguable that federal Indian law 
supports this criticism, as the Supreme Court has already recognized the 
legal difficulty in the United States acting as both trustee and sovereign.261 
That hastily drawn conclusion misunderstands both the intent of IGRA 
as well as the Department’s ability. First, the Department’s trustee 
obligations would only be an issue under a narrow reading of IGRA, 
whereas under a broader analysis numerous courts have noted that IGRA’s 
primary objective was “fostering tribal economic self-sufficiency,” not 
addressing state concerns.262 Second, the expertise of the Department as an 
arbitrator of Indian affairs is unmatched, as it must regularly balance 
competing interests between tribes.263  
Third, the Class III Gaming Procedures avoid tribes going before federal 
courts to have their interest adjudicated. This is important as many 
American Indian legal advocates—such as John Echohawk, Director of the 
Native American Rights Fund, and Jefferson Keel, President of the National 
Congress of American Indians—believe that the federal courts are actually 
                                                                                                                 
 258. Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington State, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1994), 
cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Washington v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 517 U.S. 
1129 (1996). 
 259. See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2341 (2011). 
 260. Lindner-Cornelius, supra note 23, at 695. 
 261. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980). 
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the biased adjudicator, stating that the Supreme Court has ruled against 
tribes “three out of every four” times since the 1970’s.264  
Fourth, there is no reliable data that the Department of the Interior lacks 
objectivity concerning tribal interests.265 For example, there are some that 
claim the Office of Indian Gaming approves an almost unanimous amount 
of land into trust applications for gaming purposes,266 those numbers do not 
include the tribes that withdrawal their applications to avoid rejection.267 
There are also numerous instances where the work product that comes out 
of the Department of the Interior represents the middle ground between the 
state and tribal interests. 
Finally, the appearance of a lack of objectivity within the Class III 
Gaming Procedures functions more broadly than originally conceived, 
because if states truly doubt the fairness of the regulatory process or the 
Department, then they have the option to go to court.268 This ensures both 
the adjudication of claims arising under IGRA, and that the state gets to 
choose the forum. Truthfully, a more generous legal avenue for states is 
difficult to imagine.  
C. IGRA’s Intent 
As discussed previously, IGRA’s intent was not merely to give states 
more rights in Indian gaming, but was to create a regulatory scheme that 
would provide states, as an interested party, an ability to engage tribes in an 
agreement that would allow tribes to develop economic sustainability and 
self-determination through gaming.269 This reiteration is important, because 
Circuit Courts are not blind to the fact that IGRA has since become a tool 
of mass exploitation.270 While IGRA originally intended to aid tribal 
“economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 264. Susan Shannon, NARF and NCAI Advise Tribes to Stay Away from Supreme Court, 
KGOU (Sep. 27, 2013), http://kgou.org/post/narf-and-ncai-advise-tribes-stay-away-supreme-
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 265. See infra Appendix. 
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 268. Alabama v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1323-24 (S.D. Ala. 2008) 
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governments,”271 states have used Seminole to hijack IGRA to extort 
tribes.272 And Congress has done nothing about it.273 
The compact process for class III gaming is an excellent example of 
IGRA’s perverted intention.274 Compacts are possibly illegal, and take 
tribal resources earned as “revenue sharing” to avoid the tax prohibition 
Congress established within IGRA.275 Nonetheless, besides the Class III 
Gaming Procedures, revenue sharing remains the only realistic mechanism 
to entice states to negotiate compacts.276 The ultimate irony is that to 
compensate for review sharing within compacts, tribes expand their gaming 
operations to include off-reservation gaming facilities, which is what states 
allegedly opposed in the first place.277 Additionally, revenue sharing and 
Class III Gaming Procedures both derive from the intent of IGRA rather 
than its text, meaning that many opponents of the Class III Gaming 
Procedures would logically leave tribes with no avenue for class III 
gaming.278 
D. Tribal Sovereignty 
Although definitions of tribal sovereignty may differ, it is often the case 
that sovereignty is closely related to tribal economic development and self-
determination.279 This relationship is hardly coincidental as tribal 
sovereignty exercised through self-determination provides opportunities for 
economic development, and economic development, in turn, provides 
revenue for tribes to pursue self-determination.280 Moreover, when tribes 
are dealing with poverty, health issues, and other social welfare issues, 
                                                                                                                 
 271. TOMAC, Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 865 
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economic development could not be more important.281 For example, the 
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation—formally Prisoner of War Camp 334—
faces the worst living conditions in North America.282 
Gaming offers some tribes the ability to determine their own economic 
futures, while reinforcing the principle of inherent sovereignty.283 
Economic development—such as gaming—requires that tribes have the 
ability to make their own sovereign decisions for two main reasons.284 First, 
tribal decision makers are “directly accountable to their constituency, as 
opposed to federal officials whose objectives may be different than the 
tribes they represent.”285 Second, sovereignty in itself is “a major 
development resource, since it offers ‘distinct . . . market opportunities, 
from reduced tax and regulatory burdens’ as well as ‘unique niches [in 
areas such as] gaming.’”286 
Moreover, there cannot be a singular approach to tribes, as all tribes 
encompass unique traits, both culturally and geographically.287 
Consequently, all forms of potential economic development should be 
available to all tribes as there is no one size fits all solution.288 The Class III 
Gaming Procedures may be the only avenue some tribes have to access 
economic development, and are thus vital for tribal sovereignty.289 
V. Conclusion 
It is of dire importance that the opponents of the Class III Gaming 
Procedures reconsider their views. As long as hundreds of tribes remain 
economically devastated due to the ongoing ramifications of allotment and 
removal, then the first priority within the modern era should be economic 
development of tribes. It is a goal that should appeal to the small 
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government desires of traditional conservatives as well as the altruistic need 
of modern liberals, and yet Congress has done nothing to fix Seminole.  
Perhaps many see a casino as a symbol for greed and crime. 
Nevertheless, when the worst poverty in North America exists on Indian 
reservations, there is no time to pass judgment. As far as a moral 
assessment is concerned, there is nothing more devoid of ethical substance 
than to judge the means of those in need while enjoying lands and resources 
taken. The notion that casinos fester with greed and crime seems foreign 
when one considers that the money it generates provides housing, schools, 
transportation, jobs, infrastructure, emergency services, and offers tribes a 
stronger, faster, and better means of economic development.  
Are the Class III Gaming Procedures perfect? No. They are an imperfect 
solution to an exploitive problem. Yet, the baseline question should be 
“who is going to fix it?” Congress has proven it will not. Federal courts 
remain split on the issue. The Class III Gaming Procedures are the only 
viable solution that allow tribes to develop economic sustainability and self-
determination. 
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Paula Hart, Director 
Office of Indian Gaming - Department of the Interior 
MS-3657-MIB 
1849 C Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20240 
 
Dear Director Hart: 
 
My name is Austin R. Vance, and I am a second year law student at the 
University of Oklahoma College of Law.  I am currently working on a 
comment for the American Indian Law Review about the "Class III 
Gaming Procedures" published in 25 C.F.R. § 291.1-15.  In order to 
complete my research, I would greatly appreciate if you took the time to 
answer the following questionnaire.  If you are unable to answer, please 
give a brief reason for the omission.  For example, ''the answer contains 
confidential information" would be a reasonable response.  When you 
have completed the questionnaire, please place your signature at the 
bottom certifying that the answers were completed  to the best of your 
knowledge and ability. 
 








Has the Secretary of the Interior ever used the Class III Gaming 
Procedures found in 25 C.F.R. §§ 291.1-15?  If so, please explain 




Since the publication of 25 C.P.R. Part 291 in 1999, the Department has 
received eight applications for Secretarial gaming procedures under the 
regulation.  The Department has yet to issue class III gaming procedures 
under Part 291.  As explained in greater detail below, two of the 
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applications were mooted because the tribes concluded compacts that 
were approved and published in the Federal Register (Seminole Tribe of 
Florida and Confederated  Tribes of the Colville Reservation).  The 
Department disapproved one application (Santee Sioux Nation, 
Nebraska).  Two applications  have been placed on hold (Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians and Poarch Band of Creeks).  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated Part 291 in Texas v. US., 
497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007), which mooted two applications that were 
pending at the time of the court's decision (Kickapoo Traditional Tribe 
of Texas and the Jena Band of Choctaw Indians).  The Department 
received an application from the Pueblo of Pojoaque, New Mexico, in 
2014, but the Department has been enjoined from processing pending a 
decision from the Tenth Circuit on the validity of Part 291. 
 
1.  In 1999, the Confederated  Tribes of the Colville Reservation applied 
for Secretarial gaming procedures under Part 291.  In 2002, the Tribe 
and the State of Washington reached an agreement on a tribal-state 
gaming compact, in part, as a result of the procedures process. 
 
2.  In 1999, the Seminole Tribe of Florida applied for Secretarial gaming 
procedures under Part 291.  In 2007, the Tribe and the State of Florida 
reached an agreement on a tribal-state gaming compact, in part, as a 
result of the procedures process and related federal court litigation. 
 
3.  In 1999, the Santee Sioux Nation, Nebraska, applied for Secretarial 
gaming procedures under Part 291.  In 2005, the Department disapproved 
the Tribe's application because the proposed scope of gaming exceeded 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act's (IGRA) limitation that tribes may 
only operate games permitted under state law for "any person, 
organization, or entity." 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (b)(1)(A). 
 
4. In 1999, the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians applied for Secretarial 
gaming procedures under Part 291.  The Tribe did not pursue its request 
for procedures because the Department's scope of gaming determination  
found that the Tribe's proposed scope of gaming exceeded the legal 
scope of gaming allowed in the State of Florida. 
 
5. In 2003, the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas applied for 
Secretarial gaming procedures under Part 291.  The State of Texas 
responded to the Department's invitation to participate in the procedures 
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process under Part 291 by challenging the validity of the regulation in 
federal court. In 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
invalidated Part 291, which mooted the Tribe's application. See Texas v. 
U.S., 497 F.3d 491 (2007). 
 
6. In 2006, the Poarch Band of Creeks applied for Secretarial gaming 
procedures under Part 291.  The State of Alabama later challenged the 
validity of Part 291 in federal court, but the court upheld the regulation.  
See Alabama v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Ala. 2008). 
Alabama did not appeal, but the application has been put on hold at the 
Tribe's request. 
 
7. In 2007, the Jena Band of Choctaw Indians applied for Secretarial 
gaming procedures under Part 291.  Later that year, the Court of Appeals 
or the Fifth Circuit handed down its ruling in Texas that invalidated Part 
291 in Louisiana as well as Texas (and Mississippi), and mooted the 
Tribe's application. 
 
8. In 2014, the Pueblo of Pojoaque, New Mexico, applied for Secretarial 
gaming procedures under Part 291.  The State of New Mexico responded 
to the Department's invitation to participate in the procedures process 
under Part 291 by challenging the validity of the regulation in federal 
court.  The district court enjoined the Department's processing of the 
application pending a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit on the State's challenge to the regulation. 
 
Question 2 
Was the language of the Class III Gaming Procedures modeled after the 
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida?  
Specifically, I am referring to where the decision states: 
 
Nevertheless, we are left with the question as to what 
procedure is left for an Indian tribe faced with a state that not 
only will not negotiate in good faith, but also will not consent 
to suit.  The answer, gleaned from the statute, is simple.  One 
hundred and eighty days after the tribe first requests 
negotiations with the state, the tribe may file suit in district 
court.  If the state pleads an Eleventh Amendment defense, the 
suit is dismissed, and the tribe, pursuant to 25 U.S.C.§  
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2710(d)(7)(B)(vii), then may notify the Secretary of the 
Interior of the tribe 's failure to negotiate a compact with the 
state.  The Secretary then may prescribe regulations governing 




Question 2 seems to inadvertently conflate the quoted passage from the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), with later publication of 25 
C.F.R. Part 291.  The passage appears to refer to ''regulations" in the 
context of the Secretary prescribing ''regulations (aka procedures under 
IGRA) governing class III gaming on the tribe's  lands,"  not the Code of 
Federal Regulations. 
 
In promulgating Part 291, the Department intended to effectuate 
congressional  intent in the wake of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996).  Under the regulation, if a tribe seeking a compact 
properly notifies the state and files a timely lawsuit against the state 
under lORA, and the federal court then dismisses that lawsuit based on 
the lack of an effective waiver of the state's Eleventh Amendment  
immunity, the tribe can then submit an application to the Department to 
adopt procedures that will govern the tribe's class III gaming activities.  
See 25 C.F.R. § 291.4. 
 
Question 3 
A recent Pepperdine Law Review article stated that "100% of the 
proposed foe-to-trust acquisitions submitted to the Pacific Region BIA 




During this time period, 150 applications were submitted to the Pacific 
Regional Office by applicant tribes.  Thirty-five of those applications 
were ultimately withdrawn by the tribes and two applications were 
denied by the Department. 
 
                                                                                                                 
290. Kelsey J. Waples, Extreme Rubber-Stamping: The Fee-to-Trust Process of the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 251,278 (2012). 
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In general, regional offices and tribes work together to develop and 
process applications to acquire land in trust.  Not all applications result 
in a final decision, however.  A tribe may withdraw its application for a 
variety of reasons, including an inability to complete the application 
process.  A regional office may also return an inactive application rather 
than deny it. 
 
Question 4 
Some statistics, such as the one in Question 3, seem to indicate that the fee-
to-trust process is too easy or "rubber-stamping."291   Would you explain 




There are a number of factors that determine the length of the review 
time for the fee-to-trust process.  The length of time is dependent on the 
specifics of each individual tribe and its application; the factual and 
legal issues involved; the completeness and accuracy of the tribe's 
application; the length and complexity of the environmental review 
process pursuant to the National Environmental  Policy Act; the type of 
statutory acquisition authority (on-reservation discretionary, off-
reservation discretionary, or mandatory); the number and substantive 
content of comments from interested parties; and for applications to 
conduct gaming, a determination whether the land is eligible for gaming 
pursuant to lORA. 
 
Applications to acquire land in trust are developed and reviewed by 
BIA's  regional and agency offices.  The BIA's regulatory  review 
includes, among other things, consideration  of a tribe's need for 
additional land, the purposes for which the land will be used, the 
potential tax and jurisdictional  impacts on state and local subdivisions, 
and potential land use and jurisdictional conflicts.  All applications  to 
acquire land in trust require a determination  whether statutory authority 
exists to acquire the land in trust. 
 
Applications to conduct gaming are submitted to the Department in 
Washington for final action. This includes an in-depth review and 
analysis of the often-extensive factual information developed for a 
                                                                                                                 
 291. Id. at 295. 
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tribe's application, and a determination whether the application meets 
statutory and regulatory requirements. For the three most recent fee-to-
trust acquisitions for gaming purposes, the Department  took, on 




Kevin Washburn, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, has been noted as 
stating that he "couldn't  provide a list of disapprovals because the BIA 
doesn't issue very many of them. If an application has problems . . .  the 
tribe is told and withdraws it."292   This seems to indicate that statistics on 
the "rubber-stamping" of the fee-to-trust process would be misleading as 
they could not take into account various factors, such as applications being 
withdrawn. Would that be a fair conclusion to draw?  Please explain. 
 
Answer 
If a tribe's application is incomplete (sometimes due to inadequate funding 
or resources that prevent the tribe from completing it) or does not meet the 
requirements of applicable laws and regulations, the Department notifies 
the tribe.  As a result, applications that would be denied are instead 
sometimes withdrawn by the tribe or returned to the tribe with no further 
action by the Department. 
 
Question 6 
One would assume the Office of Indian Gaming would disagree with the 
notion that the fee-to- trust process for gaming lacked  meaningful 
standards" of evaluation.293  However, given the diverse nature of 
federally recognized tribes, how necessary is flexibility in the decision-
making process of the office? 
 
Answer 
Because of the unique circumstances of each tribe, including its need for  
  
                                                                                                                 
 292. Gale Toensing, “Rep. Don Young is Leading an Assault on Native Rights,” May 27, 
2015, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/05/27/rep-don-young-leading-assault-
native-rights-160494. 
 293. Waples, supra note 290, at 295. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
364 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
 
 
land and the intended purposes for the land, each fee-to-trust decision 
inherently requires a case-by-case analysis pursuant to applicable statutory 
and regulatory requirements.  This process complies with applicable law 
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